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There is an intense debate whether risk-taking behavior is partially driven by cognitive 
abilities. The critical issue is whether choices arising from subjects with lower cognitive 
abilities are more likely driven by errors or lack of understanding than pure preferences 
for risk. The latter implies that the often-argued link between risk preferences and 
cognitive abilities (a common finding is that abilities relate negatively to risk aversion 
and positively to loss aversion) might be a spurious correlation. This experiment reports 
evidence from a sample of 556 participants who made choices in two risk-related tasks 
and completed three cognitive tasks, all with real monetary incentives: number-
additions (including incentive-compatible expected number of correct additions), the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (to measure analytical/reflective thinking) and the Remote 
Associates Test (for convergent thinking). Results are unambiguous: none of our 
cognition measures plays any systematic role on risky decision making. Using 
structural equation modeling and factor analysis, we show that cognitive abilities are 
negatively associated with noisy, inconsistent choices and this effect may make higher 
ability individuals appear to be less risk averse and more loss averse. Yet we show that 
errors are more likely to appear when the two payoffs in a given decision exhibit similar 
probability. Therefore, our results suggest that failing to account for noisy decision 
making might have led to erroneously inferring a correlation between cognitive abilities 
and risk preferences in previous studies. 
Keywords: decision making under uncertainty, cognitive abilities, online experiment, risk and 
loss aversion, factor analysis. 





Typically, experimental economists use individuals’ risk-taking behavior (RTB) in 
lottery tasks to infer their preferences for risk. For instance, in the Holt and Laury 
(2002) mechanism, subjects have to choose between lottery A and B in 10 decisions 
(both lotteries with two possible outcomes and probabilities), while in Eckel and 
Grossman (2002) they have to choose among six gambles, all with a 0.5 probability of 
winning a higher prize. Generally speaking, Multiple Price List (MPL) experimental 
devices may involve a lot of probability computation. It is often observed that about 
15%–20% of the participants make inconsistent choices which do not satisfy rational 
utility maximization; a percentage that can increase dramatically in non-student 
samples (see Charness et al. 2013). In a recent study, Charness et al. (2018) showed 
that the complexity of MPL devices yield noisy estimations and this may influence 
results to a large extent, for example, on the existence of gender differences in risk 
preferences. 
The truth is that lotteries or computations involving probabilities are not easy tasks. 
Therefore, individuals’ RTB in lottery games may stem from a combination of risk 
preferences and an error/noise term which is highly influenced by cognitive abilities 
(Cabs).  
Assuming that RTB requires an ability to compute probabilities, it follows that choices 
by subjects with lower Cabs might be partially the result of mistakes or lack of 
understanding (randomness) rather than pure taste for specific prospects (risk 
preferences). However, if individuals are able to differentiate risky from non-risky 
prospects regardless of their innate capacity to evaluate probabilities, that is, even those 
endowed with low abilities can do it—then their choices reflect pure preferences for 
risk.  
This question is not new and has been explored using administrative, survey 
(incentivized and hypothetical) and experimental data (typically from the lab) on RTB. 
In the next section, we summarize the main findings for each of these three strands of 
the literature. There is indeed converging evidence showing that individuals with higher 
Cabs are less risk averse and more loss averse (e.g., Dohmen et al. 2018, Chapman et 
al. 2018, Lilleholt 2019). However, as the literature review shows, previous studies 
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suggest that these results might be affected by errors or inconsistent choices, as well as 
by the measurement instrument and the Cabs measures used. 
Therefore, the critical issue is to unravel whether there is a true link between risk 
preferences and Cabs (i.e., not due to noise or errors) and whether this link depends on 
the risk-taking task and Cabs measures used. To address this question, we ran an 
experiment with two important features:  
i) We measured RTB using incentive-compatible standard tasks in both the gain 
(Holt & Laury 2002) and mixed (including both gains and losses; Gächter et al. 
2007) domain to elicit risk and loss aversion, respectively. We also tested for 
“noisy”, inconsistent decision making in the two tasks. We define 
inconsistencies as those choices which do not satisfy rational utility 
maximization. 
ii) Given that there is an ample spectrum of Cabs, we asked our subjects to 
complete three different tasks: summations under time pressure (to measure 
mathematical abilities; we also elicited the expected number of correct 
summations to measure over/under-confidence), CRT (to measure the 
disposition to rely on analytical thinking vs. intuition, see Brañas-Garza et al. 
2019) and the Remote Associates Test (RAT; to measure convergent thinking, 
see Shen et al. 2018).  
All the tasks were presented to the participants in random order. We used a 
representative sample of first-year, undergraduate Spanish students enrolled in 
Business Economics comprising 556 participants who made their decisions online. 
Although we found no systematic significant relationship between Cabs and RTB in 
our sample, the observed trends are in line with previous findings that higher Cabs are 
associated with less risk aversion and more loss aversion. Moreover, we find that higher 
Cabs (especially analytical and convergent thinking) are significantly negatively related 
to noisy, inconsistent decision making.  
In addition, we also observed that being inconsistent is associated with more risk-averse 
and less loss-averse choices, which implies that in these tasks risk aversion is 
overestimated and loss aversion is underestimated due to decision makers’ errors. 
Along these lines, Andersson et al. (2016, 2020) argued that a relatively high number 
of decisions in the risk-averse domain is responsible for the overestimation of risk 
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aversion due to errors because random decision making leads subjects to choose each 
option with equal probability. That is, individuals’ true preferences are closer to risk 
neutrality than their choices reveal when there are (too) many decisions in the risk-
averse domain. Applied to our results, this argument entails that our subjects’ true 
preferences are less risk averse but more loss averse compared to what we observe. In 
other words, it seems that our risk aversion task (Holt and Laury 2002) has too many 
decisions in the risk-averse domain while our loss aversion task (Gächter et al. 2007) 
has too few decisions in the loss-averse domain.  
In our sample, inconsistent individuals tended to choose left-hand side options more 
often in both tasks compared to consistent individuals. Left-hand choices imply risk-
averse and non-loss-averse choices in the risk and loss aversion tasks, respectively. 
However, the sole fact that inconsistent individuals choose the left-hand option more 
often cannot explain Andersson et al.’s (2016, 2020) results because they found the 
opposite in one of their tasks. Thus, we discard this explanation. 
Instead, both ours and Andersson et al.’s (2016, 2020) findings can be explained by the 
number of decisions in which probability calculation is difficult. We infer from the data 
that inconsistent individuals tend to choose according to expected payoff maximization 
when the realization probability of the smaller payoff is high (about 70% or higher) but 
start choosing randomly when the realization probability of both payoffs is similar. This 
indicates that difficulty/complexity increases as realization probabilities of the two 
payoffs get closer. Note that Andersson et al. are necessarily silent on the potential 
effect of changing probabilities because both payoffs in their tasks are always realized 
with 50% probability. Once inconsistent individuals start choosing randomly, they tend 
to continue doing so even though the probabilities of the two payoffs start diverging 
again, now in favor of the larger payoff, as happened in our risk aversion task (Holt and 
Laury 2002). The latter might be due either to path dependence or to the fact that 
computations are harder when the larger payoff is associated to a high realization 
probability. Future research should explore these possibilities in detail.  
Given that in the risk aversion task the expected values of both options are closer the 
more similar the payoffs’ probabilities are, it might be the case that difficulty is related 
to decisions in which expected payoffs are similar rather than decisions in which 
payoffs’ probabilities are similar. The risk aversion task does not allow us to 
disentangle this. Yet, our results from the loss aversion task, where the payoff 
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probabilities are always 50%, but the expected payoffs vary along the task, speak 
against such an alternative interpretation. If expected-payoff similarity were associated 
to random decision making, we should observe more random choices in the 5th decision 
than in the rest of decisions because it is in the 5th decision where the expected payoffs 
of both options are identical. However, we observe that decision 5 is precisely the only 
one in which we can reject random decision making among inconsistent individuals 
(although we attribute this to chance, this result allows us to conclude against the 
alternative explanation). 
Therefore, we do not find that inconsistent individuals simply choose randomly, as 
suggested by Andersson et al. (2016, 2020), but that they generally do so when 
probability computations are hard, that is, when both payoffs have a similar realization 
probability. Both in our loss aversion task (Gächter et al. 2007) and in the risk aversion 
tasks of Andersson et al. (2016, 2020), all decisions have a 50% probability for both 
payoffs. Thus, inconsistent decision making is directly associated with randomness in 
these tasks and errors therefore tend to be associated with a number of safe choices 
closer to the central value. In the loss aversion task, the central value would be three 
safe choices out of six, which is exactly what we find for inconsistent individuals on 
average; for consistent individuals, the average is 3.53. This means that errors lead to 
an underestimation of loss aversion. In contrast, according to this account, 
computations become notoriously difficult in the Holt and Laury (2002) risk aversion 
task only after some point, precisely when consistent individuals start choosing the 
risky option more often. This explains why inconsistencies are associated with more 
safe choices in this task (6.08 and 5.44 for inconsistent and consistent individuals, 
respectively), which ultimately means that risk aversion is overestimated due to errors. 
Therefore, this explanation can account for our results in both the risk aversion and the 
loss aversion task, as well as the results of Andersson et al. (2016, 2020). 
Using structural equation modeling and factor analysis to reduce measurement error 
(Jagelka 2020, Cunha et al. 2010; see Guillen et al. 2019 for a thorough discussion on 
the topic and alternative methods), we test whether the link between Cabs and RTB is 
mediated by inconsistent decision making. Our results indicate that such a mediation in 
fact exists, so that failing to account for computational errors by low Cabs individuals 
makes them appear to be more risk averse and less loss averse than high Cabs 
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individuals in the (standard) tasks used. This, however, might dramatically change with 
different task parameterizations or in different samples.  
It is also important to note that despite the number of individuals labeled as inconsistent 
due to “irrational” choices, there is also a potential and unknown proportion of 
consistent individuals who appear consistent by chance. Thus, the effects we observe 
can be considered as a lower bound of the true effects.  
We find that the indirect effects of Cabs on RTB through inconsistent decision making 
are rather small, but this might be partially explained by the particular features of our 
dataset. Although small, the mediation is statistically significant, and this provides a 
powerful explanation as to why lower Cabs can be spuriously associated to more risk 
aversion and less loss aversion. Therefore, the strength of the relationship between Cabs 
and risk preferences, at the very least, might have been overestimated in previous 
studies. 
These findings suggest that the experimental task used to measure RTB in the lab 
strongly influences the link between Cabs and risk taking. Our results cannot be easily 
extended to real-world risky decision making, however, since real-world choices are 
typically ambiguous regarding probabilities and/or payoffs. Future research should use 
tasks and real decisions with varying levels of ambiguity to test whether low Cabs 
individuals are bad at assessing risks also in those scenarios. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review the literature 
on the link between RTB and Cabs. The third section focuses on the methodology used, 




Christelis et al. (2010), Van Rooj et al. (2011), Grinblatt et al. (2011), Frisell et al. 
(2012), Cole et al. (2014), Beauchamp et al. (2017) and Angrisani and Casanova (2018) 
have studied the role of Cabs in RTB in different contexts of life: stock market 
participation, alcohol consumption and smoking, saving, portfolio selection and violent 
crime. Such studies do not measure RTB in purpose-designed tasks, but simply observe 
8 
behaviors or choices that serve as indirect observations of RTB. In this regard, Dohmen 
et al. noted that: 
while risk-taking behavior has been found to be correlated with various facets 
of cognition, the sign and magnitude of the correlation seems to vary across 
contexts and studies. With a closer look at this variation, however, a pattern 
emerges. Cognitive ability tends to be positively correlated with avoidance of 
harmful risky situations and to be negatively correlated with risk aversion in 
advantageous situations. (2018: 120) 
This might be indicating that high cognitive ability is associated with risk neutrality. 
According to these same authors (2018: 120), “evidence for this emerges both from 
studies of behavior in risky situations, often conducted by psychologists and 
psychiatrists, and also from studies focused on economic decision-making” as, for 
example, stock market participation. 
That said, since these studies use proxies that indirectly infer risk taking from observed 
behavior in different facets of life, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about RTB. 
For instance, time is an important underlying factor beyond risk (i.e., volatility) in many 
of these decisions, thus time preferences may also determine savings, drug use and 
violent crime, among others (Åkerlund et al. 2016, Bickel et al. 1999, Meier and 
Sprenger 2012). Moreover, the Cabs measures differ greatly from one study to another. 
For example, Christelis et al. (2010) employed math, verbal and recall tests and found 
similar results for each of the three measures; Angrisani and Casanova (2018) tested 
separately for numeracy and “cognition” (episodic memory and fluid intelligence) and 
also found similar relationships for the two types of measures, while Grinblatt et al. 
(2011) combined psychological tests assessing mathematical, verbal and logical skills 
into one composite score. 
Survey data 
Chapman et al. (2018) used incentivized experimental tasks (similar to MPL with 
dynamic optimization) to infer risk preferences in a survey conducted with a 
representative US sample. Their Cabs measure is given by the number of correct 
answers to nine items combining fluid intelligence, spatial ability and cognitive 
reflection. Booth and Katic (2013) used hypothetical lottery investment and a self-
assessment questionnaire about risk attitudes (i.e., general and financial risk taking) in 
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Australian birth-cohort data. However, their measure of cognitive abilities is just a 
proxy (academic performance ranking used for university entrance). Falk et al. (2018) 
developed the Global Preference Survey (GPS), an experimentally validated survey 
dataset on risk and time preference, positive and negative reciprocity, altruism and trust 
of 80,000 people in 76 countries. They elicited RTB through a series of related 
quantitative questions (hypothetical lottery choice sequence using the staircase method) 
as well as one qualitative question (self-assessment: willingness to take risks in 
general). The GPS also elicited a self-reported proxy for Cabs by asking people to 
assess themselves by the statement “I am good at math” on an 11-point Likert scale. 
Chapman et al. (2018) showed that the choices of participants with higher Cabs are 
more loss averse and less risk averse. Falk et al. (2018) confirmed that risk-averse 
choices are more likely for individuals with lower Cabs. Yet, Booth and Katic (2013) 
did not find a statistically significant correlation between Cabs and RTB. 
Again, however, the RTB as well as Cabs measures vary greatly from one study to 
another. In contrast to the above administrative data papers, these studies tend to 
combine their Cabs measures into a single variable rather than analyzing them 
separately. 
Experimental data 
The experimental study of the link between RTB and Cabs in the lab is fairly extensive.2 
Lab experiments typically involve controlled environments and self-selected samples 
of university students. Cabs are measured through different devices, such as grades, test 
scores, Raven’s matrices, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and graduate 
examination records, among others. 
These studies can be classified into three groups. First, several studies find that higher 
Cabs are associated with more risk taking, which is consistent with previous studies 
using administrative and survey data (see, for instance, Cokely and Kelley 2009, Burks 
 
2 See for instance, Brañas-Garza et al. (2008), Oechssler et al. (2009), Cokely and Kelley (2009), Burks 
et al. (2009), Campitelli and Labollita (2010), Sousa (2010), Dohmen et al. (2010), Brañas-Garza and 
Rustichini (2011), Beauchamp et al. (2012), Mather et al. (2012), Tymula et al. (2012), Rustichini et al. 
(2012, 2016), Benjamin et al. (2013), Sutter et al. (2013), Taylor (2013, 2016), Booth et al. (2014), Cueva 
et al. (2015), Andersson et al. (2016), Park (2016), and Pachur et al. (2017). 
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et al. 2009, Dohmen et al. 2010, Campitelli and Labollita 2010, Brañas-Garza and 
Rustichini 2011,3 Rustichini et al. 2012, 2016, Benjamin et al. 2013, Taylor 2013, 
Booth et al. 2014, Cueva et al. 2015 and Park 20164). According to Dohmen et al. 
(2018), however, a closer look at the existing results suggests that the sign of this 
relationship may change depending on whether lotteries involve both gains and losses 
or only gains. In particular, their literature review indicates that high Cabs individuals 
may be less risk averse (in the gains domain) but more loss averse. 
Second, null results are found in Brañas-Garza et al. (2008), Sousa (2010), Tymula et 
al. (2012), Mather et al. (2012), Sutter et al. (2013), Taylor (2013,5 20166) and Pachuret 
al. (2017). 
Finally, while the above experimental evidence of a negative relation between Cabs and 
risk aversion seems compelling, much evidence has also shown that estimated risk 
preferences based on MPL are highly sensitive to the presentation of the task and to 
changes in the choice set. For instance, Beauchamp et al. (2012) tested whether choices 
over risky prospects and the resulting preference parameter estimates are affected by 
framing effects that are implicitly introduced by the experimenter. Their experimental 
results indicate that RTB is sensitive to scale effects but insensitive to information about 
expected value.7 
Along these lines, Andersson et al. (2016) argued that the direction of the bias generated 
by behavioral noise depends on the choice set of the risk elicitation task (see also 
Andersson et al. 2020). They argue that although different studies suggest a negative 
correlation between risk aversion and Cabs, Cabs might be related to random decision 
making rather than to risk preferences. In particular, they show that noise causes 
 
3 These authors show that higher reasoning ability is associated with a higher willingness to take risks 
among males. 
4 Park shows that this result holds for a high probability of gain or a low probability of loss. When 
subjects face a low probability of gain or a high probability of loss the correlation reverses. 
5 Taylor estimates that cognitive ability is inversely related to risk aversion when choices are hypothetical 
but is unrelated when the choices are real. 
6 In this study, the author finds that the inverse relationship between risk aversion and Cabs is not robust 
and that high-ability subjects may misrepresent their preferences when facing hypothetical choices. 
7 They present subjects with several MPL and find that inferred risk preferences vary systematically with 
the type of list used. The lists differ depending on whether there are many decisions in the risk-averse or 
in the risk-loving domain. 
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underestimation of risk aversion in a risk-elicitation task containing many decisions in 
the risk-loving domain but causes overestimation in a task containing many options in 
the risk-averse domain. They find that such errors are correlated with Cabs in a large 
sample of subjects drawn from the general Danish population. To demonstrate that the 
danger of false inference is real for standard risk-elicitation tasks, they chose two risk-
elicitation tasks such that one produces a positive correlation and the other a negative 
correlation of risk aversion and Cabs. Taken together, these results indicate that an 
observed correlation between RTB and Cabs is task-contingent and hence spurious. In 
fact, it is a relatively common finding that low Cabs individuals are more likely to make 
inconsistent choices in risk-taking tasks (Burks et al. 2009, Chapman et al. 2018, 
Dohmen et al. 2018). 
Recently, Jagelka (2020), using a random preference model to isolate the role of 
irrational, inconsistent RTB from true risk preferences and factor analysis to reduce 
Cabs measurement error, arrived at similar conclusions. His analysis shows that a single 
factor of Cabs obtained from a set of eight (mostly self-reported) measures correlates 
negatively with inconsistent decision making in MPL tasks but is uncorrelated with 
underlying true risk preferences. 
Therefore, the results in this branch of the literature are somewhat more mixed and 
seem to indicate that the relationship between Cabs and RTB is highly sensitive to the 
task used and that noise or errors may play an important role. Whether different Cabs 
measures yield different results has also often been overlooked, since much of the 
evidence is based on measures combining different Cabs. A recent meta-analysis, which 
did not account for inconsistent decision making and excluded studies using self-
reported risk-taking measures and proxy (indirect) measures of Cabs, found a weak but 
significant negative relationship between Cabs and risk-averse choices in the gain 
domain but no relationship when losses are possible (Lilleholt 2019). However, further 
meta-regressions fail to find clear systematic moderators of this relationship (either task 
type, Cabs measures used, gender or age). 
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Experimental design and methods 
a. Participants and recruitment 
This paper uses a nationally-by-regions representative sample of n = 556 (the sample 
represents a population of 11,780 students; 52.5% females) comprising first-year, 
Spanish students enrolled in Business Economics (BusEc hereafter). We computed the 
participation or weight of every university in the national-by-regions representative 
population using the BusEc enrollment in September 2017 by universities provided by 
the Spanish Ministry of Education. This participation rate was the basis for computing 
the number of participants corresponding to each university. Institutions with few 
students were not included. Instead, the resulting shares were assigned to the largest 
universities of the same region.8 
In order to find students from every region of Spain, we first contacted university 
professors by email to ask them to collaborate. We only contacted the professors in 
charge of courses taught in year one (freshmen) according to the official webpage. We 
asked them whether they were in fact the lecturer(s) in charge of the course and then 
we requested the person in charge to help with the recruitment.9 All the lecturers were 
asked to announce the recruitment in class 48 hours before the experimental online 
platform was open. Apart from other practical information, a specific login/password 
was provided for each institution in the announcement.10 
Self-selected participants logged in at home on Behave4 Diagnosis (a webpage 
specifically designed to run economic experiments online11) and completed the tasks. 
The participants were given one hour and informed that after 30 min of inactivity the 
system would automatically switch off. Once the number of required participants for a 
given university was achieved, no more students for this institution were allowed to 
participate. An important issue here is that, in the absence of a proper lab, we have little 
 
8  The website https://sites.google.com/site/pablobranasgarza/projects/across-spain provides all the 
relevant information: weight calculations, maps and sample size by university and region. 
9 The two emails we sent are available on the website in both Spanish and English (see footnote 8). 
10 Our system does not preclude the possibility of students sharing the code with friends that do not match 
our sampling criteria. A questionnaire helps us to control for this potential issue. 
11 https://diagnosis.behave4.com/. 
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control over subjects’ behavior across the experiment. Moreover, we cannot ensure that 
they are making choices alone. Nevertheless, online economic experiments are being 
increasingly used, and recent evidence suggests that the results obtained are valid and 
comparable to those obtained in physical lab settings (Anderhub et al. 2001, Horton et 
al. 2011 and Arechar et al. 2018). 
One out of every 10 participants was randomly selected for real payment (i.e., each 
participant had a 10% chance of getting paid for real). At the end of the experiment, a 
random mechanism determined whether the participant was one of the winners or not. 
If selected, participants were asked for their email in order to contact them. Payments 
were made by bank transfer. One decision (from the entire set of games and tasks) was 
randomly selected for each winning subject to compute his/her payment. This has been 
proven as a valid cost-saving payment method in economic experiments (Charness et 
al. 2016). The 56 participants who were selected to be paid earned on average €41.37. 
The payments ranged from €0 (12 individuals) to €120 (two individuals). The average 
length of the experiment was 50 min. There was no show-up fee, and therefore no 
payment, for non-selected participants. 
This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of Middlesex University Business 
School. All participants signed an informed consent prior to participating.  
b. Experimental tasks 
Students faced a set of incentivized experimental economics tasks including measures 
of time preferences, risk aversion, loss aversion and distributive preferences. They also 
played seven incentivized one-shot canonical games on social behavior (Ultimatum, 
Dictator, Trust, Public Goods Game, Third Party Punishment, Stag Hunt and Beauty 
Contest). All participants performed all the tasks in a randomly generated order with no 
feedback. All tasks implemented real monetary incentives. For this research we used 
the following tasks: 
a) Cabs. The Cabs-related tasks and measures are as follows: 
• Number of correct 4-digit summations in 60 seconds (similar to the piece rate 
condition in Niederle and Vesterlund 2007): sumsi. This variable measures math 
proficiency in a stressful environment. Participants received €3 for each correct 
answer. 
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• Expected number of correct summations in the above task: expect sumsi. 
Participants received €60 if they made the correct guess and €0 otherwise. 
• Overconfidencei = expect sumsi - sumsi (this way of measuring overconfidence 
is labeled as “overestimation” in Moore and Healy 2008; see also Guillen et al. 
2019). 
• 7-item CRT (Capraro et al. 2017; adapted from Frederick 2005 and Toplak et 
al. 2014). This test measures the disposition to override an intuitive/automatic 
answer to a problem, which is indeed incorrect. We obtain two measures: (i) 
Number of analytical or reflective responses in the test (reflectivei), that is, 
number of correct answers; (ii) number of intuitive, incorrect responses 
(intuitivei). Participants received €50 if they gave the correct answer from a 
randomly chosen item and €0 otherwise. 
• 13-item RAT (adapted from Mednick 1962). This task measures participants’ 
convergent thinking or the ability to find a single solution from apparently 
unconnected information, often referred to as convergent creativity. More 
specifically, participants were shown 13 groups of three words related to 
another, single word and had to find the correct word for each item (e.g., for 
“square/cardboard/open” the correct answer is “box”). The measure of 
convergent thinking is determined by the number of correct answers 
(convergenti). Participants received €60 if they gave the correct answer in a 
randomly selected item and €0 otherwise. 
b) RTB. The basic measures regarding RTB are (see Appendix 2 for instructions): 
• Number of risk-averse choices in a standard 10-item risk aversion task (Holt 
and Laury 2002): risk aversioni.. Earnings: lottery A: p*€40, (1-p)*€32; lottery 
B: p*€77, (1-p)*€2; with p increasing from 0.1 to 1 in 0.1 increments. Note that 
this task contains 6 decisions in the risk-averse domain and 4 decisions in the 
risk-loving domain (see Andersson et al. 2016 for a discussion on the effect of 
these relative numbers on RTB). 
• Number of loss-averse choices in a standard 6-item loss aversion task (Gächter 
et al. 2007, Mrkva et al. 2019): loss aversioni. Initial endowment: €35. Potential 
losses/gains if accepting to play the lottery: 1st choice: 1/2*(-€10) + 1/2*(+€30); 
2nd choice: 1/2*(-€15) + 1/2*(+€30); …6th choice: 1/2*(-€35) + 1/2*(+€30), 
that is, potential losses increase in €5 increments from €10 to €35 across 
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decisions. Note that this task contains four decisions in the loss-averse domain 
and one decision in the “loss-loving” domain (the 5th choice does not correspond 
to any of these domains specifically since identical gains and losses are equally 
probable). 
c) Measures of noisy, inconsistent decision making: Finally, we define binary variables 
that capture whether the individual made inconsistent (“irrational”) choices in the RTB 
tasks (e.g., multiple switching between options A and B or choosing the strictly 
dominated option A in the last decision of the risk aversion task).12 The variables are 
as follows: 
• Rinconsistenti takes the value of 1 if the participant’s choices in the risk aversion 
task were inconsistent. 
• Linconsistenti takes the value of 1 if the participant’s choices in the loss aversion 
task were inconsistent. 
The analysis of inconsistent choices is extended in the results (section b) to account for 
different types of inconsistency. 
 
Results 
a. Preliminary analysis 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for all the basic dependent and explanatory 
variables used. As can be seen, the sample is reduced in three observations for expect 
sums and hence for overconfidence due to the exclusion of outliers (using the mean ± 3 
SD rule).  
 
12 Note that our method to classify choices as inconsistent assumes that there is no preference shock 
during the task. That is, if the individual suffers a preference shock (for instance, arising from new 
important life information), she will change her utility function during the task. In such case, multiple 
switching could still be preserving rational utility maximization and would therefore not be 
“inconsistent”. Although we cannot get rid of the potential existence of preference shocks, we consider 
them to be very unlikely. 
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Table 2 shows zero-order Pearson correlations between all the variables used. Even 
though our variables are not necessarily continuous or normally distributed, we employ 
Pearson parametric correlations because they allow for sampling weights.13 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (computed using sampling weights) 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent variables      
Rinconsistent 556 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Linconsistent 556 0.14 0.35 0 1 
risk aversion 556 5.55 1.88 0 10 
loss aversion 556 3.45 1.41 0 6 
      
Explanatory variables      
sums 556 8.85 3.58 0 21 
expect sums 553 6.90 2.98 1 29 
overconfidence 553 -1.98 2.90 -12 27 
reflective 556 2.89 1.90 0 7 
intuitive 556 2.59 1.67 0 6 
convergent 556 4.78 2.29 0 11 
       
Control variables      
female 556 0.51 0.50 0 1 
income 556 4.71 2.24 0 9 
age 556 19.22 2.63 17 45 
Note: Income information is only defined for 507 individuals, the rest is missing. To avoid 
losing observations in the analyses with controls, we imputed the missing values to the 
estimates of an OLS with income as the dependent variable and gender, age, and region as 
explanatory variables. 
 
Regarding the relationships between our dependent variables, we observe that the 
number of risk-averse and loss-averse choices, that is, risk aversion and loss aversion, 
are positively albeit weakly correlated (p = 0.03), as expected. Also, a larger number of 
risk-averse choices is positively associated with being inconsistent in the risk aversion 
task (Rinconsistent; p < 0.01) and negatively, but marginally, associated with being 
inconsistent in the loss aversion task (Linconsistent; p = 0.09). On the other hand, a 
larger number of loss-averse choices is negatively associated with Linconsistent 
 
13 The use of a parametric rather than non-parametric approach, such as the Spearman correlation, is less 
problematic when the number of observations is large, as in our case, because both approaches tend to 
yield qualitatively similar results; Spearman does not allow sampling weights. 
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(p < 0.01). Finally, Rinconsistent and Linconsistent are positively related (p < 0.01). 
These results are important because they reflect the fact that being inconsistent is linked 
to a larger number of risk-averse choices and a smaller number of loss-averse choices.  
The observed positive relationship between risk aversion and Rinconsistent is in line 
with the argument of Andersson et al. (2016) where the existence of a relatively large 
number of decisions in the risk-averse domain in a risk-taking task explains why 
decision errors tend to be associated to more risk-averse choices. In our task, indeed, 
there are six [four] decisions in the risk-averse [risk-loving] domain. Applied to our 
results on loss aversion, this means that there are too few decisions in the loss-averse 
domain in our task: the task has only one decision in the “loss-loving” domain and four 
decisions in the loss-averse domain, yet this seems insufficient to eliminate the 
underestimation of loss aversion (i.e., the negative relationship between Linconsistent 
and loss aversion).  
For the explanatory variables, Table 2 shows that math proficiency (sums) is strongly 
positively correlated with individuals’ expectations (expect sums) but negatively with 
overconfidence (both p < 0.01). As expected, sums are positively correlated with both 
reflective and, to a lesser extent, convergent, and negatively correlated with intuitive 
(all p < 0.01). Similar relationships are observed for expect sums (all p < 0.01). 
Overconfidence is negatively [positively] related to reflective [intuitive], although both 
relationships are marginal (both about p = 0.09). Finally, reflective [intuitive] is 
positively [negatively] related to convergent (stronger for reflective; both p < 0.01). 
These relationships follow expectations according to the previous literature (Bosch-
Domènech et al. 2014; Frederick 2005; Corgnet et al. 2016). In sum, the array of Cabs 
measures used in this study are all correlated in the expected direction. 
These findings suggest that these Cabs measures may have a common underlying 
factor, although they also capture different aspects of Cabs. For this reason, we perform 
a factor analysis to obtain a single factor capturing a general measure of Cabs, which 
reduces measurement error concerns (Cunha et al. 2010, Jagelka 2020). We also apply 
the same method to the risk and loss aversion measures to reduce measurement error. 
The analysis of the individual effect of each Cabs measure on our dependent variables 
is presented in the Appendix and only summarized here. 
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Table 2. Zero-order Pearson correlations for all the variables used 
 risk aversion loss aversion Rinconsistent Linconsistent sums expect sums overconfidence reflective convergent 
loss aversion 0.09**         
 (0.03)         
Rinconsistent 0.13*** -0.00        
 (0.00) (0.95)        
Linconsistent -0.07* -0.14*** 0.16***       
 (0.09) (0.00) (0.00)       
sums -0.04 -0.02 -0.00 0.00      
 (0.37) (0.59) (0.89) (0.95)      
expect sums -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.62***     
 (0.49) (0.30) (0.47) (0.29) (0.00)     
overconfidence 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.59*** 0.26***    
 (0.80) (0.72) (0.65) (0.29) (0.00) (0.00)    
reflective 0.00 0.09** -0.14*** -0.21*** 0.22*** 0.20*** -0.07*   
 (0.92) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08)   
convergent -0.07* -0.05 -0.12*** -0.09** 0.14*** 0.17*** -0.00 0.22***  
 (0.10) (0.21) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.00)  
intuitive 0.00 -0.08* 0.06 0.12*** -0.20*** -0.18*** 0.07* -0.76*** -0.13*** 
 (0.96) (0.07) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) 
Note: p-values in parentheses. Correlations computed using sampling weights. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
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While these relationships will be studied in more detail in the structural equation models 
of subsection (d) and in the Appendix, it can be seen from Table 2 that the only Cabs 
measure that correlates significantly with risk aversion is convergent, which displays a 
negative relationship, albeit marginal (p = 0.10). Regarding loss aversion, only 
reflective and intuitive yield significant correlations, showing a positive and negative 
relationship, respectively (p = 0.03 and 0.07, respectively). Although rather weak, these 
findings are somewhat in line with previous studies reporting that high Cabs individuals 
are less risk averse and more loss averse (e.g., Dohmen et al. 2018, Chapman et al. 
2018, Lilleholt 2019).  
 
b. Factor analysis – accounting for measurement error 
One important concern when using different measures of Cabs is measurement error 
(Jagelka 2020, Guillen et al. 2019). Typically, any measurement instrument makes 
errors with some probability. This is especially likely in instruments based on human 
responses (Cunha et al. 2010). In particular, it is well known that measures of cognitive 
skills tend to be correlated, as in our case, and are therefore often seen as imperfect 
measurements of a common underlying factor of general cognitive (or mental) ability 
(Jensen 1998). A standard way of reducing measurement error and getting a single 
measure of Cabs is using factor analysis (Jensen 1998, Jagelka 2020).  
Factor analysis allows us to obtain a robust measure of the unobserved latent 
characteristic “general Cabs” in which measurement error is substantially reduced 
compared to each Cabs individual measure separately. We apply factor analysis to a 
combination of 20 dummy variables, reflecting whether the participant gave the 
reflective response in each of the 7 CRT questions and the correct word in each of the 
13 RAT questions, plus (standardized) sums and expect sums as continuous variables.14  
 
14  Intuitive and overconfidence are not included to avoid overspecification of the model and 
multicollinearity issues. We conduct the factor analysis using the three outliers detected in expect sums 
in order to keep all the 556 observations. If we instead exclude them, the results are very similar. 
Alternatively, one factor combining only the CRT and RAT questions also yields very similar results. 
These analyses are available upon request. In all cases, we use sampling weights to build the principal 
factor.  
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We label the resulting principal factor, which is standardized by construction, as 
CAfactor and the loadings of each variable can be found in Table A.1 (Appendix 1). 
Although all 22 variables load positively on CAfactor, the highest loadings are observed 
for question 9 of the RAT and questions 3 and 4 of the CRT, respectively, with loadings 
>0.45. The lowest loadings are observed for questions 7 and 13 of the RAT and for 
expect sums, with loadings <0.15. Therefore, we obtain a single measure of Cabs in 
which each Cabs-related variable has a different weight, calculated to minimize 
measurement error. 
To consider potential measurement errors created by the elicitation tasks (MPL devices) 
on top of respondents’ errors, we extend the previous factor analysis to our measures 
of risk and loss aversion. That is, we combine the 10 decisions in the risk aversion task 
into one single measure of risk aversion which, rather than merely adding-up the 
number of safe choices, gives a different weight to each choice. We label the resulting 
principal factor as RAfactor and the loadings can be found in Table A.2. In fact, 
although all the variables load positively on RAfactor, decisions 7 and 6, respectively, 
yield the highest loadings (≥0.70) whereas decisions 1 and 2, respectively, yield the 
lowest loadings (≤0.15). This was somewhat expected because a majority of individuals 
switch in decisions 6 and 7. Still, the differences between RAfactor and risk aversion 
are (qualitatively) small since they are strongly positively correlated (Pearson r = 0.98, 
p < 0.01). This procedure allows us to obtain a measure of risk preferences which is 
less dependent on the specific task parameterization. In other words, our initial 
definition of risk aversion does not account for measurement error, and this might be 
different in “important” choices (such as decisions 6 or 7) as compared to 
“unimportant” choices (decisions 1 and 2). However, risk aversion treats all decisions 
identically as it is given by the total number of safe choices. Factor analysis alleviates 
concerns about the existence of such potentially asymmetric measurement errors and 
therefore allows us to obtain a more robust measure of the latent trait (i.e., risk 
preferences). This is given by RAfactor. 
We repeat the factor analysis for the six decisions of the loss aversion task and obtain 
LAfactor, which reflects loss aversion. Loadings can be found in Table A.3. Decisions 
5 and 6, respectively, display the highest loadings (> 0.74), whereas decision 2 displays 
the lowest loading (0.02). Interestingly, decision 1 loads negatively on LAfactor, albeit 
weakly (-0.16), but LAfactor is still strongly correlated to loss aversion (Pearson r = 
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0.80, p < 0.01). These findings suggest that the first decision (in which the potential 
loss is €10 and the potential gain is €30 over an initial endowment of €35) performs 
slightly against the underlying latent factor of loss aversion, whereas the second 
decision (-€15 vs. +€30) is virtually orthogonal to it.      
In sum, using factor analysis we create three variables: on CAfactor for cognitive 
abilities, RAfactor for risk aversion and LAfactor for loss aversion. 
c. Inconsistent choices and their relationship with Cabs 
Before analyzing in detail the relationship between Cabs and the RTB measures, we 
focus on inconsistent choices. First, we want to explore the difference between the 
choices of consistent and inconsistent individuals. It is important to emphasize that the 
definition of inconsistency is just a lower bound since individuals making consistent 
choices by chance are also labeled as consistent, and the number of these individuals is 
impossible to be assessed. 
Regarding the risk aversion task, Figure 1 displays the fraction of safe choices in each 
decision for both consistent and inconsistent individuals. Consistent individuals (blue 
line) show a very clear trend: they begin by choosing the safe option (98.4% for the 
first two decisions, 97% for the third decision) and then reduce their safe choices 
monotonically until decision 10, in which none of them choose the safe (dominated) 
option. Since random decision making implies that each option is chosen with a 
probability = 0.5, we test whether the fraction of safe choices is different from 0.5 in 
each decision using proportion tests (corrected for multiple hypothesis testing). For 
consistent individuals, we can reject random decision making in all decisions (p < 0.01) 
except decision 6 (p = 1), in which they seem to be indifferent between the two options.  
The same analysis is performed for inconsistent individuals (orange line in Figure 1). 
For the first three decisions, the pattern of safe choices is similar to that of consistent 
individuals, although the line is slightly below (≥85% of the individuals choose the safe 
option). Hence it is rather clear that they do not choose randomly in these decisions (all 
proportions are higher than 0.5, p < 0.01). For decisions 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, however, the 
proportion test cannot reject that they play randomly at the 5% significance level 
(although it is marginally significant in decision 4, p = 0.08; p = 1 in the rest). Decisions 
6 and 10 are different: the proportion test rejects random decision making (p < 0.02). 
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In decision 6 [10], inconsistent individuals are more likely to choose the safe [risky] 
option. A possible explanation for this behavior is the following. When probability 
computation is easy, as in decisions 1, 2 and 3 where the smaller payoff is realized with 
≥70% probability in both options, inconsistent subjects calculate the expected payoff 
and select the option yielding the highest value (i.e., the safe option). However, when 
probability computation becomes harder after decision 4, in which the smaller payoff 
is realized with 60% probability in both options, inconsistent individuals start making 
random choices. Since the last decision involves no computation (the larger payoff is 
realized with 100% probability), the majority selects the choice with higher expected 
value although a fraction of them continue making random choices, probably due to 
inattention or simple path dependence. The case of decision 6 does not match this 
explanation, yet this is arguably due to chance because the erratic pattern of safe choices 
among inconsistent individuals is visible in decisions 4 to 9. 
 
 
Figure 1. Risk aversion task: fraction of safe choices in each decision by consistent 
and inconsistent individuals 
 
In short, inconsistent subjects start choosing according to expected payoff 
maximization because computation is simple. However, as computation becomes 
harder, they switch to random choices. Given that risk aversion is calculated as the sum 
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of safe choices, the fact that inconsistent individuals choose randomly in those decisions 
in which the safe option attracts consistent individuals less means that the value of risk 
aversion increases (relatively) among the former.  
It is important to emphasize that this problem is different in the loss aversion task, since 
the probabilities do not change across the task (50% probability in all scenarios), but 
the payoffs do change (see Bruner 2017 for a discussion on the role of changing 
probabilities vs. changing payoffs for decision errors). According to the above 
rationale, computations are more difficult when both payoffs have a similar probability 
of realization, which means that inconsistent individuals should choose randomly in all 
decisions in the loss aversion task.  
Figure 2 reports a decision-by-decision analysis for the loss aversion task. The same 
protocol as above allows us to reject that consistent individuals (blue line) play 
randomly for all of the six decisions (p < 0.01). They start by choosing the safe option 
with 7.5% probability and this proportion increases monotonically until decision 6, in 
which 95.2% of them do so. However, inconsistent individuals (orange line) display a 
clearly erratic pattern already from decision 1 (39.2% choose the safe option). In fact, 
the results of the proportion tests indicate that we cannot reject that inconsistent 
individuals choose randomly in decisions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 (p > 0.38). The only exception 
is decision 5 (p < 0.01), yet this can be again attributed to chance because the pattern 
of choices of inconsistent individuals along the task does not follow any clear trend. 
Since, on average, consistent individuals choose the safe option in four out of the six 
decisions, inconsistent individuals’ random choices (adding up to three safe choices on 
average) make them appear less loss averse than consistent individuals.  
In sum, random choices arise when probability calculations are more difficult, and this 
seems to be associated to decisions in which both payoffs have a similar probability of 
realization. An alternative rationale might be that random choices are more likely when 
both options have a similar expected payoff. This could explain our findings on risk 
aversion, since payoff-probability similarity in the risk aversion task goes along with 
expected-payoff similarity (both increase from the extreme to the central decisions). 
However, for the loss aversion task, this account would entail that randomness should 
feature more likely in decision 5 than in the other decisions, because it is only in 
decision 5 where both options have an identical expected payoff (€35; since accepting 
the lottery entails 50% probability of losing €30 or winning €30, out of the initial €35). 
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Our findings do not support this alternative explanation; if anything, decision 5 is 
associated to less randomness than the rest of decisions. 
 
Figure 2. Loss aversion task: fraction of safe choices in each decision by consistent 
and inconsistent individuals 
Next, we explore the impact of Cabs on inconsistent choices. For the sake of brevity, 
in the main text we focus on the Cabs measure obtained using factor analysis (i.e. 
CAfactor), whereas the analysis of the individual Cabs measures is relegated to the 
Appendix. As we will see in subsection (d), CAfactor is a negative predictor of both 
Rinconsistent and Linconsistent. Both with and without controls for age, gender and 
household income, a one standard deviation increase in CAfactor is associated with a 
reduction of 0.07 [0.08] in the likelihood of being inconsistent in the risk [loss] aversion 
task (p < 0.01, logit estimates). That is, higher Cabs individuals are less likely to make 
choices which do not satisfy rational utility maximization. This ultimately implies that 
restricting the sample to participants who make consistent MPL choices implies 
selecting those endowed with better cognitive abilities. This result is in line with 
previous studies (Andersson et al. 2016, 2020, Burks et al. 2009, Chapman et al. 2018, 
Dohmen et al. 2018, Jagelka 2020). 
To further explore the nature of these findings, we conduct an additional analysis. For 
this analysis we first disentangle the two possible reasons why a participant can be 
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labeled as inconsistent in the risk aversion task. A participant could have been coded as 
inconsistent in this task either:  
i) for having switched back, that is, choosing the risky lottery B in one 
row/decision and then choosing the safe lottery A in the next one (usually 
referred to as “multiple switching”) or  
ii) for having chosen lottery A in the last row where it is strictly dominated by 
lottery B (since lottery A offers €40 and lottery B €77, both with 100% 
probability).  
Whereas the first reason also applies to the loss aversion task, the second one does not. 
Thus, we define three new variables: number of switchbacks in the risk aversion task 
(Rswitchbacks; ranging from 0 to 4; average [SD] = 0.205 [0.529]), number of 
switchbacks in the loss aversion task (Lswitchbacks; ranking from 0 to 3; average [SD] 
= 0.157 [0.414]), and whether the participant chose the dominated option in the last 
decision of the risk aversion task (choose_dominated; dummy variable; proportion = 
0.056). In this way, we are able to perform a more fine-grained analysis of multiple 
switching patterns, initially assuming noisier decision making for those making a larger 
number of switchbacks.  
Most importantly, this procedure allows us to partially separate the inability to calculate 
probabilities or expected values (the first nine decisions in the risk aversion task and all 
six decisions in the loss aversion task require calculating probabilities) from the 
inattention associated to choosing the dominated option in the last decision of the risk 
aversion task (which does not require making calculations). The former is measured by 
Rswitchbacks and Lswitchbacks, whereas the latter is captured by choose_dominated. 
Note, however, that there are individuals who also made several switchbacks among 
those who chose the dominated option. 
Table 3 shows the results of a series of regressions in which these three measures of 
inconsistency are modeled as a function of CAfactor. In the regressions without 
controls, we find that a one standard deviation increase in CAfactor is associated with 
a reduction of 0.11 [0.08] in the number of switchbacks in the risk aversion [loss 
aversion] task (p < 0.01). Adding controls barely affects the results.  
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Table 3. Impact of CAfactor on the number of switchbacks in the RTB tasks and on the 
choice of the dominated option in the risk aversion task  














CAfactor -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.02 -0.02 































N 556 556 556 556 556 556 
Notes: OLS estimates for Rswitchbacks and Lswitchbacks; logit estimates (presented as marginal 
effects) for choose_dominated. We use robust standard errors in all regressions. P-values are shown in 
parentheses. Sampling weights are enabled in all regressions. Rswitchbacks ranges from 0 to 4; 
Lswitchbacks ranges from 0 to 3; choose_dominated is a dummy variable. Controls variables are 
gender, age and household income. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 
Even though the proportion of participants choosing the dominated option is small (31 
participants or 5.6%), it is remarkable that CAfactor is not significantly related to 
choose_dominated (p > 0.23). Therefore, these results appear to indicate that better 
cognitive abilities only impact on inconsistent decision making by reducing the 
likelihood of making wrong probability or expected-payoff calculations but not by 
reducing the likelihood of being inattentive to the task. 
To expand on these results, we combine the above variables and perform a multinomial 
regression analysis to test the effect of Cabs on the likelihood that a participant is 
classified into one of the following mutually exclusive groups. For the risk aversion 
task:  
(i) consistent individuals (82%),  
(ii) individuals making one switchback (12%), 
(iii) individuals making more than one switchback (4%),  
(iv) individuals choosing the dominated option in the last decision but not 
making any switchback (i.e., those choosing the safe lottery A in all 10 
decisions; 2%).  
Similarly, for the loss aversion task:  
(i) consistent individuals (87%),  
(ii) individuals making one switchback (11%), 
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(iii) individuals making more than one switchback (2%).  
The results of the multinomial regressions for the risk aversion task are presented in 
Table 4.  
Table 4. Impact of CAfactor on inconsistency in the risk aversion task. Multinomial 
regression 
 Dominated 1 switchback More than 1 switchback 
Base group: 
           Without      With 
controls   controls 
                Without      With 
                   controls    controls 
                Without        With 
                    controls      controls 










































Notes: Multinomial logit estimates (marginal effects). We use robust standard errors in all regressions. P-
values are shown in parentheses. Sampling weights are enabled in all regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** 
p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
We find that those individuals choosing the dominated option (without switchbacks) 
are not significantly different from consistent individuals in terms of Cabs, as measured 
by CAfactor (p > 0.87 with and without controls). However, higher Cabs individuals 
are significantly more likely to be classified in the consistent group than in the “one 
switchback” group and even more so than in the “more than one switchback” group 
(p < 0.02 with and without controls). Marginal effects indicate that an increase of one 
standard deviation in CAfactor is associated with about a 5% reduction in the 
probability of making one switchback and a 2–3% reduction in the probability of 
making more than one switchback in the risk aversion task. Therefore, again, these 
results suggest that (low) Cabs are related to the likelihood of making errors in 
calculations involving probabilities, not to inattention during the task. Moreover, it 
seems that the effect of Cabs increases monotonically along with the number of errors 
(i.e., switchbacks). 
Table 5 shows the multinomial regressions for the loss aversion task. Higher Cabs 
individuals are significantly more likely to be classified in the consistent group than in 
the “one switchback” group (p < 0.01 with and without controls: marginal effect = 6–
7%); the difference with respect to the “more than one switchback” group is zero, 
however (p > 0.29 with and without controls). The latter result suggests that for the loss 
aversion task the effect of Cabs does not increase monotonically along with the number 
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of errors (i.e., switchbacks). Ultimately, these findings indicate that for the main 
analyses the most appropriate measures of inconsistency are given by Rinconsistent and 
Linconsistent, which combine all those cases in which choices do not satisfy rational 
utility maximization into one category and can therefore be applied to any MPL task. 
Table 5. Impact of CAfactor on inconsistency in the loss aversion task. Multinomial 
regression 
 1 switchback More than 1 switchback 
Base group: 
                Without      With 
                      controls    controls 
                Without        With 
                       controls      controls 























Notes: Multinomial logit estimates (marginal effects). We use robust standard errors in all regressions. P-
values are shown in parentheses. Sampling weights are enabled in all regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** 
p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
As analyzed in the Appendix (see Tables A.5 to A.13 and the accompanying text in 
Appendix 1), when we consider each Cabs measure separately, we observe that 
reflective (and to a lesser extent intuitive, in the opposite direction) and convergent are 
the measures that can explain the above results, with no effect of sums, expect sums or 
overconfidence.  
Taken together, these results suggest that cognition (especially reflective vs. intuitive 
thinking and convergent thinking) is associated with the process of making probability 
calculations rather than with paying attention to the task or not. 
As we mentioned before, it is important to remark that our analysis of errors is 
necessarily affected by the fact that we use inconsistent choices as an “imperfect” proxy 
for irrational behavior. Indeed, among those making consistent choices there might be 
a fraction of them who did so by chance (even though they are unable to assess the 
options’ risk correctly). These individuals are impossible to uncover, thus their number 
remains unknown. This implies that the effects we observe may represent a lower bound 
of the true effects. 
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d. The effect of Cabs on RTB mediated by inconsistent 
decision making 
Finally, we explore the impact of Cabs on our RTB dependent variables using structural 
equation modeling (SEM). SEM allows us to study whether inconsistent decision 
making mediates the relationship between Cabs and RTB. We can say that inconsistent 
decision making explains (i.e., mediates) part of this relationship if the indirect effect 
of Cabs on RTB through Rinconsistent/Linconsistent is statistically significant, 
regardless of whether a total effect exists (Rucker et al., 2011). In particular, if 
inconsistent decision making explains why higher Cabs individuals may appear to be 
less risk averse and more loss averse, we expect the indirect effect of Cabs through 
Rinconsistent to be negative on risk aversion and the indirect effect through 
Linconsistent to be positive on loss aversion.  
In addition, since decisions in the loss aversion task involve risk and we cannot assume 
linear utility for the relevant range of payoffs (i.e., between €0 and €65), we model loss 
aversion as being potentially affected by risk preferences. Note that our tasks do not 
allow us to estimate preference parameters for risk aversion and loss aversion 
simultaneously. Thus, we can only control for the potential effect of risk aversion on 
loss aversion.  
The conceptual framework of the resulting SEM is presented in Figure 3. With this 
SEM we will be able to estimate the total, direct and indirect effects for the impact of 
Cabs on both risk aversion (mediated by Rinconsistent) and loss aversion (mediated by 
Rinconsistent, risk aversion and Linconsistent) simultaneously.  
We first study the total, direct and indirect effects of CAfactor (a combination of CRT, 
RAT questions plus sums and expect sums, see Table A.1, Appendix 1) on risk aversion 
and loss aversion (Table 6). Then we replicate the SEM using RAfactor and LAfactor 




Figure 3. Conceptual framework of the structural equation model 
 
Table 6 displays the effects estimated using SEM. We show estimates with and without 
control variables in adjacent columns. The top panel of the table refers to the equations 
explaining risk aversion, which include CAfactor and Rinconsistent as explanatory 
variables and Rinconsistent as an intermediate dependent variable (i.e., as a mediator). 
Apart from the indirect effect of CAfactor on risk aversion through Rinconsistent, 
which is our main focus, the direct/total effects of CAfactor on Rinconsistent and the 
direct/total effects of Rinconsistent on risk aversion are also reported. Since 
Rinconsistent is a dummy variable, we implement logit as the link function to the 
equation in which Rinconsistent is the dependent variable; OLS is used as the link 
function for the remaining equations. Therefore, we conduct a generalized SEM which 
allows different functional forms for each equation (the results are qualitatively similar 
if we apply OLS to all equations; not reported). Logit estimates are reported as marginal 
effects to be comparable with OLS estimates. The bottom panel shows the estimates for 
the equations in which loss aversion is the main dependent variable, with CAfactor, 
Linconsistent, Rinconsistent and risk aversion as explanatory variables, and 
Linconsistent, Rinconsistent and risk aversion as intermediate dependent variables (i.e., 
mediators). We use sampling weights in all cases. 
Regarding inconsistent decision making, we can see that the direct effect of CAfactor 
on both Rinconsistent and Linconsistent is negative and significant (p < 0.01 with and 









to be inconsistent. A one standard deviation increase in CAfactor is associated with a 
7% [8%] reduction in the probability of being inconsistent in the risk [loss] aversion 
task. In addition, the direct effect of Rinconsistent is positive and significant on risk 
aversion (p = 0.02 with and without controls), whereas the direct effect of Linconsistent 
is negative and significant on loss aversion (p < 0.01 with and without controls), in line 
with previous analyses. According to the effect sizes, being inconsistent in the risk 
[loss] aversion task is associated with about 0.6 more risk-averse [0.5 less loss-averse] 
choices. Although, as expected, the total effect of CAfactor is negative on risk aversion 
and positive on loss aversion, none of the estimates are significant (p > 0.46). The direct 
effects of CAfactor on risk aversion and loss aversion (i.e., after the effect through 
inconsistent decision making is eliminated) are again largely insignificant (p > 0.74). 
 
Table 6. SEM: Impact of CAfactor on risk/loss aversion mediated by 
Rinconsistent/Linconsistent 
 Direct effects Indirect effects 
(via R/Linconsistent) 
Indirect effects 


































































































Notes: Testing mediation effects using (generalized) structural equation modeling. The link functions are OLS, 
except for when Rinconsistent or Linconsistent are the dependent variables, in which we use logit. Marginal 
effects are reported and p-values are shown in parentheses. We use robust standard errors. Control variables are 
gender, age and household income. Sampling weights are enabled in all regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.10. 
 
The indirect effects of Rinconsistent and Linconsistent, on the other hand, are 
significant for risk aversion (p = 0.07 with and without controls) and loss aversion (p = 
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0.01 without controls, p = 0.02 with controls), respectively. A one standard deviation 
increase in CAfactor is associated with a 0.04 reduction [increase] in the number of 
risk-averse [loss-averse] choices through inconsistent decision making (with controls 
the effect is reduced to 0.03 for loss aversion). Interestingly, the indirect effects on loss 
aversion through risk aversion are not significant (p > 0.20) and, in fact, removing the 
possibility of an effect of risk aversion on loss aversion from the model does not affect 
the results (not reported).  
This analysis indicates that decision-making errors can partly explain why individuals 
with higher Cabs may appear to be less risk averse and more loss averse. Admittedly, 
the indirect effects are rather small; yet they are statistically significant, thus indicating 
mediation. We expect this mediation to be larger in experiments with design features 
leading to a significant relationship between Cabs and RTB. In addition, as mentioned 
earlier, the observed effects can be considered as a lower bound of the true effects 
because there is an unknown share of consistent individuals whose pattern of behavior 
resembles rational utility maximization by chance.  
When we consider each Cabs measure separately (see Tables A.14 to A.19 and the 
accompanying text), we again observe that analytical (reflective) and convergent 
thinking are the measures that better explain the observed indirect effects, with no 
influence of sums, expect sums or overconfidence. However, the estimates are rather 
weak and change substantially across Cabs measures, thus suggesting that the factor 
analysis indeed provides for a good solution to reduce measurement error. 
Table 7 replicates the SEM of Table 6 but using RAfactor and LAfactor instead of risk 
aversion and loss aversion, respectively. Here we can see that being inconsistent in the 
risk [loss] aversion task is associated with about a 0.5 [1.06] standard deviation increase 
[reduction] in RAfactor [LAfactor] (p < 0.01 with and without controls). The total and 
direct effects of CAfactor on RAfactor and LAfactor are again non-significant, although 
in the expected direction (p > 0.16). However, the indirect effect of CAfactor through 
inconsistent decision making is significantly negative on RAfactor (p = 0.02 with and 
without control) and significantly positive on LAfactor (p < 0.01 with and without 
controls). A one standard deviation increase in CAfactor is associated with a 0.04 [0.08] 
standard deviation decrease [increase] in RAfactor [LAfactor] due to the effect of 
inconsistent decision making. Note that the sizes of the indirect effects are still small 
but more robust than in the previous analysis. In addition, the direct effect of RAfactor 
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on LAfactor as well as the remaining potential mediations (i.e., the indirect effects on 
LAfactor through RAfactor) are not significant (p > 0.72). 
Therefore, once measurement errors are reduced on both the dependent and the 
explanatory variable, the mediation is even stronger. This corroborates our hypothesis 
and suggests that factor analysis is indeed a good method to further exploit the 
information underlying RTB and Cabs (imperfect) measures (Cunha et al. 2010, 
Jagelka 2020).  
 
Table 7. SEM: Impact of CAfactor on RAfactor/LAfactor mediated by 
Rinconsistent/Linconsistent 





































































































Notes: Testing mediation effects using (generalized) structural equation modeling. The link functions are OLS, 
except for when Rinconsistent or Linconsistent are the dependent variables, in which we use logit. Marginal 
effects are reported and p-values are shown in parentheses. We use robust standard errors. Control variables are 
gender, age and household income. Sampling weights are enabled in all regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.10. 
 
Conclusions 
Using a large, nationally representative sample of business economics students from 
Spain, our study yields several important results.  
In general, the study supports the hypothesis that risk preferences are not correlated to 
individuals’ cognitive abilities, such as math proficiency, analytical (reflective) 
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thinking or convergent thinking. Instead, we find that individuals with higher Cabs (in 
particular, those who rely more on reflection than intuition and those displaying better 
convergent thinking) are less likely to make inconsistent choices in the risk-related 
tasks. 
Therefore, our results indicate that preferences for risk in either the gain or the loss 
domain are not driven by cognitive abilities. Taken together, our results support the 
notion that low Cabs are related to irrational decision making rather than to risk 
preferences. Moreover, from further analyses we are able to conclude that it is the 
process of computing probabilities—or expected values— rather than paying attention 
to the task that is associated with cognition: individuals with higher cognitive abilities 
make less mistakes, but are not more (or less) attentive to the task. 
Using structural equation models and factor analysis to reduce measurement error, we 
show that being inconsistent is associated with more risk-averse choices and less loss-
averse choices. And, precisely, it is the lack of consistency that makes lower Cabs 
individuals appear to be more risk averse and less loss averse. Our results suggest that 
failing to properly account for irrational choices might lead to a spurious negative 
[positive] relationship between Cabs and risk [loss] aversion (in contrast to the 
suggestion of Chapman et al. 2018, however). In this regard, we observe that 
inconsistent individuals tend to choose according to expected value maximization when 
computations are easy, and this seems to be associated with decisions in which the 
smaller payoff is realized with high probability (about ≥70%). As the realization 
probabilities of the larger and smaller payoffs get closer, computations appear to 
become more complex and inconsistent individuals start choosing randomly. Due to the 
tasks typically used, this account entails that risk aversion may have been overestimated 
and loss aversion may have been underestimated in previous studies. However, this is 
not because inconsistent individuals just choose randomly in all scenarios but 
particularly when the probabilities of the two options are similar.  
The above findings suggest that the relationship between Cabs and risk taking is highly 
dependent on the task used, that is, on whether probabilities or payoffs change across 
decisions (see Bruner 2017). Ultimately, this means that the current results cannot be 
easily extended to real-world risky decision making, except to those (rare) cases when 
there is no ambiguity about probabilities and payoffs. Future research should explore 
the link between Cabs and risk taking using tasks and real decisions with varying levels 
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of ambiguity in order to test whether low Cabs individuals are bad at assessing risks 
also when probabilities and/or payoffs are unknown. 
An important contribution of this paper is related to selection. If subjects who fail to 
pass the consistency requirement are dropped from the sample and these are the subjects 
with lower cognitive abilities, then the restricted sample selects participants who have 
higher cognitive abilities.  
Still there is a more intricate problem related to the potential number of individuals 
whose choices are wrongly labeled as consistent. This may be the case, for instance, of 
subjects who never switch back or make consistent choices by chance although they do 
not understand the decisions. Detecting these individuals does not seem to be an easy 
endeavor. A possible solution might be to ask subjects about the procedure they follow 
to make the choices or to use a larger number of MPL tasks (e.g., Andersson et al. 2016, 
2020, Jagelka 2020).  
All in all, the effects and magnitudes seem to be highly sensitive to the task itself and 
the statistical analysis of inconsistent choices. This might explain why previous results 
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APPENDIX 1: Additional statistical analyses – testing for 
different Cabs measures 
 
Table A.4 shows the results of a series of regressions in which the two dummy variables 
of inconsistency, Rinconsistent and Linconsistent, are modeled as a function of all the 
six Cabs gathered. We find that more reflective individuals are less likely to make 
inconsistent choices in both tasks (Rinconsistent, p = 0.01 without controls, p = 0.02 
with controls; Linconsistent, p < 0.01 with and without controls; the opposite is 
observed for intuitive, but only significant for Linconsistent, p = 0.04 without controls, 
p = 0.07 with controls). The individuals displaying better convergent thinking are also 
less likely to make inconsistent choices in the risk aversion task (p = 0.02 without 
controls, p = 0.01 with controls; not significant for Linconsistent, p = 0.12 without 
controls, p = 0.14 with controls).  
A robustness check is implemented in Table A.5 in which the main explanatory 
variables (i.e., sums, expect sums, reflective and convergent) are all included together 
(since overconfidence is determined by sums and expect sums, it is not included; in 
addition, we only enable reflective for the CRT since including intuitive as well would 
yield collinearity). From this analysis, we observe that both reflective and convergent 
remain significant or marginally significant in predicting inconsistent risk choices 
(Rinconsistent) when included together, which may mean that they operate 
independently to some extent. Reflective is still also significant in predicting 
inconsistent choices in the loss aversion task. Adding controls does not substantially 
change the results. In sum, our data show that subjects who score high in the CRT and 
the RAT are less likely to be inconsistent.  
As shown in Table A.6, the number of switchbacks in both the risk aversion and the 
loss aversion tasks is predicted negatively by reflective (p < 0.01 with and without 
controls) and positively, albeit more weakly (p = 0.08 without controls, p = 0.18 with 
controls), by intuitive. Convergent also relates negatively to Rswitchbacks but not 
significantly so to Lswitchbacks. When all explanatory variables are included 
simultaneously in the regressions (Table A.7), both reflective and convergent remain 
significant on Rswitchbacks, but only reflective is significant on Lswitchbacks. The 
same regressions with choose_dominated as the dependent variable do not report any 
significant coefficient (all p > 0.13); see Tables A.8 and A.9).  
41 
Table A.10 shows the output of the multinomial regression for the risk aversion task. 
We find that individuals choosing the dominated option (without switchbacks) are not 
significantly different from consistent individuals in terms of any of the Cabs measures. 
However, more reflective individuals are significantly more likely to be classified in 
the consistent group than in the “one switchback” group and even more so than in the 
“more than one switchback” group (the relationship with intuitive is also monotonically 
increasing across the two latter groups, but it is of opposite sign and only significant 
for “more than one switchback”). This difference is significant for convergent with 
respect to “one switchback” but not with respect to “more than one switchback”. The 
effects of sums, expect sums and overconfidence are never significant. The results are 
similar when all explanatory variables are included simultaneously in the regression 
(Table A.11).  
Table A.12 shows the output of the multinomial regression for the loss aversion task. 
We observe a similar pattern here: consistent individuals are significantly more 
reflective (and marginally less intuitive) than those making one switchback and even 
more so than those making more than one switchback, and they also display more 
convergent thinking than those making one switchback (not significant for “more than 
one switchback”). As before, sums, expect sums and overconfidence are never 
significant. Like in risk aversion, the results are qualitatively similar when all the 
explanatory variables are included simultaneously in the regression (Table A.13). 
Tables A.14 to A.19 present the results of the SEM for sums, expect sums, 
overconfidence, reflective, convergent and intuitive, respectively.  
In the top panel of the tables we can see that, as in previous analyses, both reflective 
(p = 0.01 with and without controls) and convergent (p = 0.02 with and without 
controls) yield a negative and significant direct effect on Rinconsistent. In particular, 
an increase of one correct answer in the CRT and RAT is associated, respectively, with 
a 3% and 2% reduction in the probability of being inconsistent in the risk aversion task. 
The estimates of the remaining Cabs measures on Rinconsistent are non-significant 
(p > 0.28). On the other hand, Rinconsistent yields a positive and significant direct 
effect on risk aversion in all models (p < 0.02), also confirming previous analyses. 
Inconsistent individuals report about 0.6 more risk-averse choices than consistent 
individuals. 
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In addition, the total effects on risk aversion are not significant for any of the Cabs 
measures (convergent is the measure for which the total [negative] effect is closer to 
significance, p = 0.19 with and without controls). This also applies to the direct effect 
of Cabs on risk aversion (i.e., after the effect through Rinconsistent is eliminated): all 
estimates are largely insignificant and convergent is the closest to significance (p = 0.29 
without controls, p = 0.28 with controls). 
Regarding indirect effects, we observe the expected negative sign in all cases (positive 
for intuitive), but it only reaches marginal significance for reflective (p = 0.08 with and 
without controls) and is close to significance for convergent (p = 0.10 without controls, 
p = 0.11 with controls). Each unit increase in reflective [convergent] is associated with 
a reduction of 0.02 [0.01] risk-averse choices due to the effect of Rinconsistent. The 
remaining indirect effects yield p > 0.32.  
In the bottom panel of the tables, we can see for the direct effects of the Cabs measures 
on Linconsistent that only the negative direct effect of reflective (p < 0.01 with and 
without controls) and the positive direct effect of intuitive (p = 0.04 with and without 
controls) are significant. In particular, an increase of one correct [intuitive] answer in 
the CRT is associated with a 4% reduction [2% increase] in the probability of being 
inconsistent in the loss aversion task. Convergent also reports a negative direct effect 
on Linconsistent, but it is just close to significance (p = 0.12 with and without controls). 
The rest of Cabs measures are not significant (p > 0.44). This is coherent with previous 
analyses. On the other hand, confirming previous analyses as well, Linconsistent yields 
a negative and significant direct effect on loss aversion (p < 0.01 with and without 
controls). Inconsistent individuals report about 0.5–0.6 loss-averse choices less than 
consistent individuals according to the estimates. 
The total effects on loss aversion are not significant for any of the Cabs measures except 
for reflective, which reports a marginally significant positive estimate (p = 0.09 with 
and without controls); for all the remaining measures, p > 0.14. Each unit increase in 
reflective is associated with an increase of 0.07 loss-averse choices (with controls, this 
is reduced to 0.05). This is similar to what we observed in the preliminary analysis. The 
direct effects of the Cabs measures on loss aversion (i.e., after the effect through 
Linconsistent is eliminated) are also non-significant (p > 0.15).  
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As expected, the indirect effect through Linconsistent is positive (it is virtually zero for 
sums, p = 0.97) in all cases (negative for intuitive), although it only reaches significance 
for reflective (p = 0.02 with and without controls) and marginal significance for 
intuitive (p = 0.09 with and without controls). A one-unit increase in reflective 
[intuitive] is associated with a 0.02 increase [0.01 reduction] in the number of loss-
averse choices due to the effect of Linconsistent. For convergent, the indirect effect is 
just close to significance (p = 0.14 and p = 0.13 with and without controls, 








Table A.1. Factor loadings - factor for Cabs 
Variable (item) Cabs Factor 
CRT 1 0.3994 
CRT 2 0.4368 
CRT 3 0.4510 
CRT 4 0.4581 
CRT 5 0.4126 
CRT 6 0.2940 
CRT 7 0.2972 
RAT 1 0.2509 
RAT 2 0.3720 
RAT 3 0.4321 
RAT 4 0.3186 
RAT 5 0.1944 
RAT 6 0.2050 
RAT 7 0.0648 
RAT 8 0.3581 
RAT 9 0.4612 
RAT 10 0.2570 
RAT 11 0.2391 
RAT 12 0.2325 
RAT 13 0.1404 
sums (standardized) 0.2794 
expect sums (standardized) 0.1461 
Notes: Factor analysis with principal factor. For each of the CRT and RAT 
items, the variable takes the value of 1 if the response is correct, 0 otherwise. 




Table A.2. Factor loadings - factor for risk aversion 
Variable (item) Risk aversion Factor 
risk 1 0.1508 
risk 2 0.1548 
risk 3 0.2000 
risk 4 0.3117 
risk 5 0.5661 
risk 6 0.6999 
risk 7 0.7369 
risk 8 0.6627 
risk 9 0.4686 
risk 10 0.2907 
Notes: Factor analysis with principal factor. For each item, 
the variable takes the value of 1 if the risk averse option is 
selected (left-hand option) and 0 if the risky option is 
selected (right-hand option). 
 
Table A.3. Factor loadings - factor for loss aversion 
Variable (item) Loss aversion Factor 
loss 1 -0.1642 
loss 2 0.0239 
loss 3 0.4679 
loss 4 0.7452 
loss 5 0.7458 
loss 6 0.6084 
Notes: Factor analysis with principal factor. For 
each item, the variable takes the value of 1 if the 
loss-averse option (reject playing the lottery) is 
selected and 0 if the non-loss-averse option is 





Table A.4. Impact of Cabs on inconsistent decision making 
 
Notes: Logit estimates (marginal effects). Each cell corresponds to a 
different regression. We use robust standard errors in all regressions. P-
values are shown in parentheses. Regressions using expect sums or 
overconfidence also exclude the three outliers detected. Sampling weights 
are enabled in all regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 
 
Table A.5. Regression analysis with all explanatory variables simultaneously. Impact 
of Cabs on inconsistent RTB 
 Rinconsistent Linconsistent 
 Without controls With controls Without controls With controls 
sums 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.46) (0.47) (0.31) (0.25) 
expect sums -0.00 .0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.87) (0.96) (0.63) (0.61) 
reflective -0.03** -0.02* -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) 
convergent -0.01* -0.01** -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.36) (0.46) 










N 553 553 553 553 
Notes: Logit estimates (marginal effects). We use robust standard errors in all regressions. P-
values are shown in parentheses. Regressions using expect sums exclude the three outliers 
detected. Sampling weights are enabled in all regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
  










sums -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.88) (0.76) (0.97) (0.86) 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.49) (0.75) (0.45) (0.50) 
overconfidence -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.67) (0.60) (0.48) (0.48) 
reflective -0.03** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
intuitive 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.02* 
 (0.29) (0.40) (0.04) (0.07) 
convergent -0.02** -0.02** -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.12) (0.14) 
N 556 556 556 556 
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Table A.6. Impact of Cabs on the number of switchbacks in the RTB tasks 
 Rswitchbacks Lswitchbacks 
 Without controls With controls Without controls With controls 
sums -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.34) (0.67) (0.95) (0.98) 
expect sums -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.21) (0.41) (0.30) (0.35) 
overconfidence -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.89) (0.80) (0.43) (0.43) 
reflective -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
intuitive 0.03* 0.02 0.03** 0.03* 
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.04) (0.06) 
convergent -0.03** -0.03** -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.29) (0.31) 
N 556 556 556 556 
Notes: OLS estimates. Each cell corresponds to a different regression. We use robust 
standard errors in all regressions. P-values are shown in parentheses. Regressions using 
expect sums or overconfidence also exclude the three outliers detected. Sampling weights 
are enabled in all regressions. Rswitchbacks ranges from 0 to 4; Lswitchbacks ranges from 
0 to 3. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 
 
Table A.7. Regression analysis with all explanatory variables simultaneously. Impact 
of Cabs on the number of switchbacks in the RTB tasks 
 Rswitchbacks Lswitchbacks 
 Without controls With controls Without controls With controls 
sums 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.74) (0.67) (0.32) (0.35) 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.70) (0.78) (0.38) (0.36) 
reflective -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
convergent -0.02* -0.02* -0.00 -0.00 




















N 556 556 556 556 
Notes: OLS estimates. We use robust standard errors in all regressions. P-values are shown in 
parentheses. Regressions using expect sums exclude the three outliers detected. Sampling 




Table A.8. Impact of Cabs on the choice of the dominated option in the risk 
aversion task 
 choose_dominated 
 Without controls With controls 
sums -0.00 0.00 
 (0.98) (0.77) 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.77) (0.96) 
overconfidence -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.77) (0.71) 
reflective -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.34) (0.50) 
intuitive 0.01 0.01 
 (0.32) (0.41) 
convergent -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.20) (0.14) 
N 556 556 
Notes: Logit estimates (marginal effects). Each cell 
corresponds to a different regression. We use robust 
standard errors in all regressions. P-values are shown in 
parentheses. Regressions using expect sums or 
overconfidence also exclude the three outliers detected. 
Sampling weights are enabled in all regressions. *** 
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
 
 
Table A.9. Regression analysis with all explanatory variables simultaneously. Impact 
of Cabs on the choice of the dominated option in the risk aversion task 
 choose_dominated 
 Without controls With controls 
sums 0.00 0.00 
 (0.67) (0.66) 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.91) (0.99) 
reflective -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.39) (0.63) 
convergent -0.01 -0.01 











N 553 553 
Notes: Logit estimates (marginal effects). We use robust standard errors 
in all regressions. P-values are shown in parentheses. Regressions using 
expect sums exclude the three outliers detected. Sampling weights are 
enabled. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
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Table A.10. Impact of Cabs on inconsistency in the risk aversion task. Multinomial regression 
Base group: Dominated 1 switchback More than 1 switchback 
                               Without        With 
controls      controls 
                        Without        With 
                                 controls      controls 
                        Without        With 
                                 controls      controls 
Consistent 
(base) 
sums 0.00 0.00 
expect sums 0.00 0.00 
overconfidence 0.00 0.00 
reflective    0.00        0.00    
intuitive -0.00 0.00 
convergent 0.00 -0.00 
 
sums 0.00 0.00 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 
overconfidence -0.01 -0.00 
reflective    -0.02**   -0.02* 
intuitive 0.01 0.00 
convergent -0.02** -0.02** 
 
sums -0.00 -0.00 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 
overconfidence -0.00 -0.00 
reflective    -0.02***    -0.01** 
intuitive 0.01** 0.01* 




 sums 0.00 0.00 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 
overconfidence -0.01 -0.01 
reflective    -0.02     -0.02 
intuitive 0.01 0.00 
convergent -0.02 -0.02 
 
sums -0.00 -0.00 
expect sums -0.01 -0.00 
overconfidence -0.00 -0.00 
reflective    -0.02**   -0.01 
intuitive 0.01 0.01 




  sums -0.00 -0.00 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 
overconfidence -0.00 -0.00 
reflective    -0.02     -0.01 
intuitive 0.01 0.01 
convergent -0.00 -0.00 
 
Notes: Multinomial logit estimates (marginal effects). We use robust standard errors and sampling weights in all regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
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Table A.11. Regression analysis with all explanatory variables simultaneously. Impact of Cabs on inconsistency in the risk 
aversion task. Multinomial regression 
Base group: Dominated 1 switchback More than 1 switchback 
                              Without        With 
                             controls      controls 
                          Without        With 
                               controls      controls 
                            Without        With 
                                  controls      controls 
Consistent 
(base) 
sums 0.00 0.00 
expect sums 0.00 0.00 
reflective    0.00     0.00 
convergent -0.00 -0.00 
 
sums 0.00 0.00 
expect sums -0.01 -0.01 
reflective   -0.02*    -0.01 
convergent -0.01* -0.01* 
 
sums 0.00 0.00 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 
reflective    -0.02**   -0.01* 




 sums 0.01 0.01 
expect sums -0.01 -0.01 
reflective   -0.02     -0.01 
convergent -0.01 -0.01 
 
sums 0.00 0.00 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 
reflective   -0.02*    -0.01 




  sums 0.00 0.00 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 
reflective   -0.02     -0.01 
convergent -0.00 -0.00 
 
Notes: Multinomial logit estimates (marginal effects). We use robust standard errors and sampling weights in all regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
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Table A.12. Impact of Cabs on inconsistency in the loss aversion task. Multinomial 
regression 
Base group: 1 switchback More than 1 switchback 
                                    Without        With 
                                   controls      controls 
                                  Without        With 
                                  controls      controls 
Consistent 
(base) 
sums 0.00 0.00 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 
overconfidence -0.00 -0.00 
reflective -0.03*** -0.03*** 
intuitive 0.02* 0.02* 
convergent -0.02* -0.01* 
 
sums 0.00 0.00 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 
overconfidence -0.00 -0.00 
reflective -0.01*** -0.01*** 
intuitive 0.00 0.00 




 sums -0.00 0.00 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 
overconfidence -0.00 -0.00 
reflective -0.01 -0.01 
intuitive 0.00 0.00 
convergent 0.00 0.00 
 
Notes: Multinomial logit estimates (marginal effects). We use robust standard errors and sampling weights in all 





Table A.13. Regression analysis with all explanatory variables simultaneously. Impact of 
Cabs on inconsistency in the loss aversion task. Multinomial regression 
Base group: 1 switchback More than 1 switchback 
                                  Without        With 
                                 controls      controls 
                                  Without        With 
                                  controls      controls 
Consistent 
(base) 
sums 0.01 0.01 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 
reflective    -0.03*** -0.03*** 
convergent -0.01 -0.01 
 
sums 0.00 0.00 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 
reflective    -0.01***    -0.01*** 




 sums 0.00 0.00 
expect sums -0.00 -0.00 
reflective    -0.01     -0.01 
convergent 0.00* 0.00* 
 
Notes: Multinomial logit estimates (marginal effects). We use robust standard errors and sampling weights 




Table A.14. SEM: Impact of sums on risk /loss aversion mediated by 
Rinconsistent/Linconsistent 
 Direct effects Indirect effects 
(via R/Linconsistent) 
Indirect effects 


































































































Notes: Testing mediation effects using structural equation modeling. Marginal effects are reported and p-values are 
shown in parentheses. We use robust standard errors. Control variables are gender, age and household income. Sampling 
weights are enabled in all regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
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Table A.15. SEM: Impact of expect sums on risk/loss aversion mediated by 
Rinconsistent/Linconsistent 
 Direct effects Indirect effects 
(via R/Linconsistent) 
Indirect effects 


















Risk aversion as function of expect sums  




















Dep var: Rinconsistent   








Loss aversion as function of expect sums  








































Dep var: Linconsistent         








Notes: Testing mediation effects using structural equation modeling. Marginal effects are reported and p-values are shown 
in parentheses. We use robust standard errors. Control variables are gender, age and household income. Sampling weights 




Table A.16. SEM: Impact of overconfidence on risk/loss aversion mediated by 
Rinconsistent/Linconsistent 
 Direct effects Indirect effects 
(via R/Linconsistent) 
Indirect effects 


































































































Notes: Testing mediation effects using structural equation modeling. Marginal effects are reported and p-values are 
shown in parentheses. We use robust standard errors. Control variables are gender, age and household income. Sampling 
weights are enabled in all regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
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Table A.17. SEM: Impact of reflective on risk/loss aversion mediated by 
Rinconsistent/Linconsistent 
 Direct effects Indirect effects 
(via R/Linconsistent) 
Indirect effects 


































































































Notes: Testing mediation effects using structural equation modeling. Marginal effects are reported and p-values are 
shown in parentheses. We use robust standard errors. Control variables are gender, age and household income. Sampling 




Table A.18. SEM: Impact of convergent on risk/loss aversion mediated by 
Rinconsistent/Linconsistent 
 Direct effects Indirect effects 
(via R/Linconsistent) 
Indirect effects 


































































































Notes: Testing mediation effects using structural equation modeling. Marginal effects are reported and p-values are 
shown in parentheses. We use robust standard errors. Control variables are gender, age and household income. Sampling 




Table A.19. SEM: Impact of intuitive on risk/loss aversion mediated by 
Rinconsistent/Linconsistent 
 Direct effects Indirect effects 
(via R/Linconsistent) 
Indirect effects 


































































































Notes: Testing mediation effects using structural equation modeling. Marginal effects are reported and p-values are 
shown in parentheses. We use robust standard errors. Control variables are gender, age and household income. Sampling 
weights are enabled in all regressions. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
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APPENDIX 2: Instructions for risk and loss aversion tasks 
 










Loss aversion (screen 1 and 2) 
 
 
 
 
